Abstract. In previous work, I have presented approaches to nonmonotonic probabilistic reasoning, which is a probabilistic generalization of default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases. In this paper, I continue this exciting line of research. I present a new probabilistic generalization of Lehmann's lexicographic entailment, called
Introduction
During the recent decades, there has been a significant amount of research in AI that concentrates on probabilistic reasoning with interval restrictions for conditional probabilities, also called conditional constraints [26] . The main focus of this research was especially on the computational aspects of probabilistic reasoning in model-theoretic probabilistic logic, which is a major approach for handling conditional constraints that can be traced back to Boole [8] . A wide spectrum of formal languages has been explored in model-theoretic probabilistic logic, ranging from constraints for unconditional and conditional events (e.g., [1, 14, 25, 26, 28, 32] ) to linear inequalities over events [12] . Probabilistic reasoning in model-theoretic probabilistic logic, however, is not the only way of handling conditional constraints. An alternative approach to probabilistic reasoning with conditional constraints is based on the coherence principle of de Finetti (e.g., [5, 16, 17] ) and has been extensively explored especially in the field of statistics. Example 1.1. Suppose we have the knowledge "ostriches are birds", "birds have legs", "birds fly with a probability of at least 0.95", and "ostriches fly with a probability of at most 0.05". In model-theoretic probabilistic logic, we then conclude that both birds and ostriches have legs, and that birds (resp., ostriches) fly with a probability of at least 0.95 (resp., at most 0.05). In coherence-based probabilistic logic, in contrast, we conclude that birds (resp., ostriches) have (resp., do not have) legs, and that they fly with a probability of at least 0.95 (resp., at most 0.05).
The relationship between model-theoretic and coherence-based probabilistic logic has recently been explored in [7] . In particular, it turned out that model-theoretic entailment is strictly stronger that entailment under coherence, while satisfiability in modeltheoretic probabilistic logic is strictly weaker than consistency in probabilistic logic under coherence. Furthermore, model-theoretic probabilistic entailment is well-known to be a generalization of model-theoretic entailment in classical propositional logics, while probabilistic entailment under coherence is a generalization of classical default entailment from conditional knowledge bases in System ¡ . Hence, it is natural to wonder whether there are probabilistic generalizations of other formalisms for default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases.
The literature contains several different proposals for default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases and extensive work on its desired properties. The core of these properties are the rationality postulates of System ¡ proposed by Kraus et al. [19] . It turned out that these rationality postulates constitute a sound and complete axiom system for several classical model-theoretic entailment relations under uncertainty measures on worlds. In detail, they characterize classical model-theoretic entailment under preferential structures, infinitesimal probabilities, possibility measures, and world rankings. They also characterize an entailment relation based on conditional objects. A survey of the above relationships is given in [4] .
Mainly to solve problems with irrelevant information, rational closure as a more adventurous entailment relation was proposed by Lehmann [23] . It is equivalent to entailment in System ¢ by Pearl [33] , to the least specific possibility entailment by Benferhat et al. [3] , and to a conditional (modal) logic-based entailment by Lamarre [22] . Finally, mainly to solve problems with property inheritance from classes to exceptional subclasses, further formalisms were proposed, in particular, lexicographic entailment by Lehmann [24] and Benferhat et al. [2] and conditional entailment by Geffner [15] .
Indeed, such formalisms for default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases can be generalized to the probabilistic framework of conditional constraints [29, 30] (see Section 5 for more details on these formalisms and some of their applications): £ In [29] , I introduce probabilistic generalizations of Pearl's entailment in System ¢ and Lehmann's lexicographic entailment, which lie between model-theoretic and coherence-based probabilistic entailment. Roughly, the main difference between model-theoretic and coherence-based probabilistic entailment is that the former realizes an inheritance of logical knowledge, while the latter does not. Intuitively, the new formalisms now add a strategy for resolving inconsistencies to model-theoretic entailment, and a restricted form of inheritance of logical knowledge to entailment under coherence. This is why they are weaker than model-theoretic probabilistic entailment and stronger than coherence-based probabilistic entailment.
£
In [30] , I introduce similar probabilistic generalizations of Pearl's entailment in System ¢ , Lehmann's lexicographic entailment, and Geffner's conditional entailment. They, however, behave quite differently from the ones in [29] . Roughly, model-theoretic probabilistic entailment realizes an inheritance of logical knowledge, but no inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge. The formalisms in [30] now add an inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge and a strategy for resolving inconsistencies (due to the inheritance of logical and purely probabilistic knowledge) to entailment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic. This is why they are generally much stronger than entailment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic.
In the present paper, I define a general approach to nonmonotonic probabilistic reasoning, which subsumes the above two approaches [29] and [30] as special cases, and which also allows for nonmonotonic probabilistic reasoning between them. Roughly, the main idea behind this new approach is to add to model-theoretic probabilistic entailment (i) some inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge that is controlled by a strength I present a new probabilistic generalization of Lehmann's lexicographic entailment, which is parameterized through a value ¢ ¡ ¤ £¥ § ¦ that describes the strength of the inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge. For ¥ (resp., ) , it coincides with probabilistic lexicographic entailment introduced in [29] (resp., [30] ). £ I show that probabilistic lexicographic entailment of strength has similar properties as its classical counterpart. In particular, it satisfies the rationality postulates of System ¡ and the property of Rational Monotonicity. £ I also show that probabilistic lexicographic entailment of strength is a proper generalization of its classical counterpart. Furthermore, it is weaker than some notion of logical entailment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic, and under certain conditions it coincides with this notion of entailment.
Note that detailed proofs of all results are given in [31] .
Preliminaries
In this section, I define probabilistic knowledge bases. I then recall the notions of satisfiability and logical entailment from model-theoretic probabilistic logic, and the notions of g-coherence and g-coherent entailment from probabilistic logic under coherence.
Probabilistic Knowledge Bases may have exceptions.
Example 2.2. The knowledge "ostriches are birds", "birds have wings with a probability between 0.65 and 0.75", "birds fly with a probability of at least 0.95", and "ostriches fly with a probability of at most 0.05" can be expressed by the probabilistic knowledge base
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Model-Theoretic Probabilistic Logic
I now recall the model-theoretic notions of satisfiability and logical entailment. A set of logical constraints and probabilistic formulas is satisfiable iff a model of
is also a model of
. A probabilistic knowledge base Table 1 , left sides. For example,
. Observe that the logical property of having legs is inherited from birds down to the subclass of eagles, while the purely probabilistic property of being able to fly with a probability of at least
is not inherited. 
Probabilistic Logic under Coherence
I now recall the notions of g-coherence and g-coherent entailment. I define them by using some characterizations through concepts from default reasoning [7] . A probabilistic interpretation 4
verifies a conditional constraint 
(resp.,
be as in Example 2.1. In probabilistic logic under coherence, ¡ ¦ ¢ represents the logical knowledge "all eagles are birds", the default logical knowledge "generally, birds have legs", and the default probabilistic knowledge "generally, birds fly with a probability of at least 0.95". It is not difficult to see that ¡ ¦ ¢ is g-coherent. Some tight g-coherent consequences of ¡ ¦ ¢ are shown in Table 1 , right sides. Observe that under g-coherent entailment, neither the logical property of having legs nor the purely probabilistic one of being able to fly with a probability of at least
is inherited from the class of birds down to the subclass of eagles. 
Key Ideas
The inheritance of logical knowledge along subclass relationships is the following property (for all events
The inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge along subclass relationships is defined as follows (for all events
, probabilistic knowledge bases
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, and intervals
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It is not difficult to verify that logical entailment satisfies (L-INH), but does not satisfy (P-INH), while g-coherent entailment satisfies neither (L-INH) nor (P-INH).
The basic idea behind the new probabilistic generalization of Lehmann's lexicographic entailment in this paper is that it adds to the notion of logical (resp., g-coherent) entailment (i) some inheritance of purely probabilistic (resp., logical and purely probabilistic) knowledge, where the inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge depends on a strength ¢ ¡ ¤ £¥ § ¦ determines to which extent purely probabilistic knowledge is inherited from classes down to subclasses. In the extreme cases of ¥ and , purely probabilistic knowledge is not inherited at all [29] and completely inherited [30] , respectively, while for 
-Consistency
I now introduce the notion of -consistency for probabilistic knowledge bases. A probabilistic interpretation 4 0
-verifies a conditional constraint
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Probabilistic Lexicographic Entailment of Strength
I now define a probabilistic generalization of Lehmann's lexicographic entailment [24] of strength
to define a lexicographic preference relation on probabilistic interpretations as follows. -entailment realizes some subclass inheritance, without showing the problem of inheritance blocking, that is, properties are also inherited to subclasses that are exceptional relative to other properties. Observe also that logical properties are completely inherited along subclass relationships, while the inheritance of purely probabilistic properties depends on the strength .
Example 3.3. Some tight intervals under
of Example 2.1 (resp., 2.2) are shown in Table 2 (resp., 3). For example,
Semantic Properties
In this section, I explore the semantic properties of
-entailment. I first study some general nonmonotonic properties. I then explore the relationship to logical entailment and to Lehmann's lexicographic entailment. [19] , which are commonly regarded as being particularly desirable for any reasonable notion of nonmonotonic entailment. The following result shows that T¡£ ¥ -entailment satisfies (probabilistic versions of) these postulates. Here, 
Another desirable property is Rational Monotonicity (RM) [19] , which describes a restricted monotony and allows to ignore some irrelevant knowledge. The next theorem shows that 
Special Cases
The notion of
) coincides with the notion of probabilistic lexicographic entailment introduced in [29] (resp., [30] ). I now briefly review these formalisms along with some of their applications.
Probabilistic Lexicographic Entailment of Strength

¥
The notion of " $ § ¦ ¨ -entailment adds to logical (resp., g-coherent) entailment a strategy for resolving inconsistencies due to the inheritance of logical knowledge (resp., a restricted form of inheritance of logical knowledge). This is why " $ ¦ -entailment is weaker than logical entailment and stronger than g-coherent entailment. Hence,
entailment is a refinement of both logical and g-coherent entailment. It can be used in place of logical entailment, when we want to resolve inconsistencies related to conditioning on zero events. Here, it is especially well-suited as it coincides with logical entailment as long as we condition on non-zero events [29] . Moreover, " $ ¦ -entailment can be used in place of g-coherent entailment, when we also want to have a restricted form of inheritance of logical knowledge. The following example illustrates the use of " $ § ¦ -entailment to resolve inconsistencies related to conditioning on zero events. 
Probabilistic Lexicographic Entailment of Strength
¢
The notion of " $ § ¦ -entailment adds to logical entailment (i) some inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge, and (ii) a strategy for resolving inconsistencies due to the inheritance of logical and purely probabilistic knowledge. For this reason, " $ ¦ -entailment is generally much stronger than logical entailment. Thus, it is especially useful where logical entailment is too weak, for example, in probabilistic logic programming [28, 27] and probabilistic ontology reasoning in the semantic web [18] . Other applications are deriving degrees of belief from statistical knowledge and degrees of belief, handling inconsistencies in probabilistic knowledge bases, and probabilistic belief revision.
In particular, in reasoning from statistical knowledge and degrees of belief,
" $ ¦ -entailment shows a similar behavior as reference-class reasoning [35, 20, 21, 34] in a number of uncontroversial examples. But it also avoids many drawbacks of referenceclass reasoning [30] : It can handle complex scenarios and even purely probabilistic subjective knowledge as input. Moreover, conclusions are drawn in a global way from all the available knowledge as a whole. The following example illustrates the use of " $ § ¦ -entailment for reasoning from statistical knowledge and degrees of belief.
Example 5.2. Suppose that we have the statistical knowledge "all penguins are birds", "between 90% and 95% of all birds fly", "at most 5% of all penguins fly", and "at least 95% of all yellow objects are easy to see". Moreover, assume that we believe "Sam is a yellow penguin". What do we then conclude about Sam's property of being easy to see? Under reference-class reasoning, which is a machinery for dealing with such statistical knowledge and degrees of belief, we conclude "Sam is easy to see with a probability of at least 0.95". This is also what we obtain using the notion of " $
